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Henderson: Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE*
P. F. IIENDERSONt
Possibly the most recent comprehensive decision upon the
Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge by a state court of last resort;
is that of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in In re Aiken
Petroleum Company v. National Petroleum Underwriters of
Western Millers Fire Insurance Company of Kansas City, Missouri, 207 S. C. 236, 36 S. E. 2d 380 (1946), 6 CCH Fire and
Casualty Cases 9.
This article is written in order to acquaint those who may
be interested in this application of the ancient concept involved, with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, and perhaps in order to examine its basis.
PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION

The plaintiffs in the litigation were Geddings Cushman and
his wife doing business in Aiken, South Carolina, as local distributors of gasoline and oil under the name of Aiken Petroleum Company, hereinafter referred to as the Petroleum
Company. The defendant above stated is a mutual insurance
company, and is hereinafter referred to as Western Millers.
As it is also necessary to a complete understanding of the
litigation, reference must be made to that company's predecessor in the business of insuring petroleum products in
South Carolina, the National Petroleum Mutual Fire Insurance
Company of Philadelphia, hereinafter referred to as the National Mutual Company, and to the general agent in South
Carolina for both companies, who is hereinafter referred to
simply as the General Agent.
At the threshold of the case was the unusual but definitely
established and admitted fact that Mr. Cushman, who had
managed the business of the Petroleum Company, had "insurance knowledge" which surpassed that of practically all laymen in that field.
*The substance of this article appeared in the September, 1946, issue of The InsLurance

Law Journa, copyrighted by Commerce Clearing House, 1946. Reprinted here with permission of author and publisher.-Ed.
tMember South Carolina Bar, Firm of Hendersons & Salley, Aiken, South Carolina.
Past-President, South Carolina Bar Association.
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He knew what a "co-insurance clause" in a fire insurance
policy meant. Admittedly, an insurance agent had tried to
sell him a policy on his petroleum products with a full co-insurance clause prior to 1937, and had shown him a printed
rating schedule regarding the same. As Cushman tersely expressed it at the trial, he had then learned that "if I had a
policy with such a clause in it for $5,000.00, and had a loss of
that amount, I could not collect but about fifty per cent of
that amount, unless I carried more insurance myself. I realized
how serious it was to buy something like that." As at that
time Cushman could not secure a policy at a lower rate than
about $4.00 per hundred, with a full co-insurance clause also
involved, he remained uninsured in so far as his petroleum
products were concerned, as he figured that he would be
paying approximately $8.00 per hundred for insurance. He
considered this figure to be prohibitive.
FACTS OF THE CASE

Then in 1937 the General Agent of the National Mutual
Company in South Carolina visited Mr. Cushman and solicited
the writing of insurance on hi petroleum products at the
amazingly low rate (when the former offer made to him was
considered), of $1.15 per hundred. Cushman testified at the
trial of the case that he immediately and anxiously asked if
co-insurance was involved, and stated his fixed aversion to
such a clause being embodied in any policy that he might
take, his feeling being that no matter what price he paid, if
he had a policy for a face vilue of say $5,000.00, with a full
co-insurance clause in it, he could not, in case of loss, collect
more than approximately $2,500.00, and that he was simply
"fooling himself." Then Cushman testified at the trial that
the General Agent in question who, as he (Mr. Cushman) described it, was evidently eager to get and keep his business,
told him that there would be no co-insurance clause in the
policy that he would write, and further in effect assured him
that no such clause, in view of his aversion thereto, would ever
be inserted in any policy that he (the General Agent) would
ever write in any company that he ever represented or any
property that Cushman might own or become interested in.
Mr. Cushman accepted the offer. Policies at $1.15 per hundred
were written by the General Agent in the National Mutual
Company in 1937, 1938, and 1939 without any co-insurance
clause. In 1940 the National Mutual Company ceased to func-
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tion in South Carolina, but the same General Agent who had
originally visited and talked with Cushman wrote renewals
at the same rate in Western Millers, of which company he
had, in the meanwhile, become General Agent in South Carolina. This policy had no co-insurance clause. Cushman examined carefully the policies for several years and ascertained
definitely that no co-insurance clause appeared in any policy up
to 1940. In 1943, a devastating fire occurred at the Petroleum
Company's plant in Aiken, with an admitted loss of a greater
amount than $4,000.00, which was the face of the existing
policy on Cushman's petroleum products. Payment of the insurance was requested, but Cushman was notified that the
policies of 1942 and 1943, which he had not examined, but
which, because a rating bureau which Western Millers had
recently joined required it, had full co-insurance clauses attached to them, and the insurance company sought to settle
the claim for approximately $2,100.00, the amount of the
policy liability with effect being given to the co-insurance
clause. Cushman was aghast at this news, he having no knowl-

edge or thought that such a clause had been inserted without
his being notified.
ACTION TO REFORM A POLICY
An action was promptly brought in the Court of Common

Pleas of Aiken County. The action, in form, was to reform
the policies of 1942 and 1943, by deleting the co-insurance
clauses, with any proper adjustment of premiums being made,
and for judgment upon the policy of 1943 as reformed for its
face value of $4,000.00 with interest and costs. The theory of
the Complaint was that when the defendant's General Agent
in South Carolina, in 1942 and again in 1943 wrote the policies,
and with no notice to Cushman embodied in them full co-insurance clauses, that, to use the language of the complaint, he
then had "in mind and memory" his original statement and
the assurance given to Mr. Cushman in 1937.
The gravamen of the complaint was that although the General Agent in question in 1937 was the General Agent of National Mutual Company, when in 1940 he became General
Agent in South Carolina for Western Millers, and wrote the
policies of 1940 and 1941 without the co-insurance clause, and
when in 1942 and 1943 he reversed his method of procedure
and, without notice to the Petroleum Company, wrote those
policies with the full co-insurance feature involved, and with-
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out any reduction in the premium charged, but in fact with
an increase therein,. he personally preparing or countersigning
all policies, and he throughout having in mind and memory
his assurance to Cushman, knew, as General Agent of Western
Millers, and it knew through him, that the policies which he
issued did not "constitute the true contract of insurance between the insured and the insurer," and therefore the offending policies should be reformed.
The nub of the matter was the contention that, under the
Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge, the second insurance company was charged with knowledge acquired by its General
Agent while he was acting as General Agent several years
previously for the first company, which knowledge the plaintiffs undertook to prove he retained when he wrote the coinsurance policies. It is to be specifically noted that the same
man personally throughout the whole matter acted for both
insurance companies.
Various defenses were presented. For instance, the defendant stoutly questioned plaintiffs' right in any event to have
the policy reformed, and there were other defenses, such as
the effect of the Statute of Frauds, and of alleged negligence
on plaintiffs' part. None of these defenses need be discussed
in this article, as they are not germane to the d6ctrine under
discussion. Suffice it to say in this connection, that the case
was hotly litigated. Entirely pertinent to this discussion is the
fact that the application of the doctrine of Imputed Knowledge
to the facts of the case was vigorously and learnedly denied
by defendant's counsel.
The case was tried before a jury upon issues framed by the
trial court. The General Agent in question categorically denied giving to Cushman the assurances upon which the case
was based, and also denied Mr. Cushman's testimony upon
which it was alleged that when he wrote the policies of 1942
and 1943 with the co-insurance clauses in question, he had
his assurances to Cushman in mind and memory, although
Cushman swore that after the fire he had, in effect, so stated.
With the testimony of the two men before it, and with many
letters which passed between them in evidence, which letters
plaintiffs claimed were directly corroborative of Mr. Cushman's testimony, the jury answered all interrogatpries agreeably to plaintiffs' contention, and the trial judge approved
and adopted the jury's findings.
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In passing it might be said that the plaintiffs definitely
refrained from attempting to enforce as a contract or agreement the General Agent's assurances to Mr. Cushman, but
that they proceeded entirely upon the theory that when the
policies embodying the co-insurance clauses were written, they
were written with the actual knowledge on the part of the
General Agent, and with the knowledge imputed to the defendant company, and because the assurances in question had
been made, the policies did not constitute true contracts of
insurance between the parties.
WAS AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE IMPUTED TO THE COMPANY
Hence, the case went to the Supreme Court of South Carolina with the facts, as herein stated, settled in favor of the
plaintiffs, and the question which was squarely presented to
the Supreme Court was whether knowledge gained by the
agent of one company while he was attending to practically
the same business, and while he had "in mind and memory"
knowledge that he had obtained when he acted for the first
company, is in law imputed to the second company. This
pivotal question was debated, with the citation of many authorities, before the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which
in a carefully prepared per curim decision unequivocally
ruled:
"The major issue involved in this case has to do with
the doctrine of imputed knowledge and under what circumstances knowledge -acquired by an agent prior to his
agency may be imputed to-his principal.
"There is a conflict of authority on the question, but
the more logical rule, and that which is supported by
the great weight of recent authority, is that knowledge
of an agent acquired prior to the existence of the agency
may be chargeable to the principal if it is clearly shown
that the agent, while acting for the principal in a transaction to which the information is material, has the information present in his mind-and memory at the time of
the transaction in question; provided the information was
not obtained under such circumstances as to make it the
legal duty of the agent not to divulge it to the principal."
All exceptions were overruled and plaintiffs collected the
full amount on their policy, the policies being reformed by
the court by the elimination of the co-insurance clauses.
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Was the application of the Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge
,to the facts of the case correct? Was the decision based upon
sound legal principles? The author thinks that it was.
U. S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

After some divergent decisions had been rendered in this
country upon the doctrine in question, the Supreme Court of
the United States clarified the concept of Imputed Knowledge
for the American courts as far back as 1870 in its "Distilled
Spirits" decision.' Therein one Boyden, before he became agent
of ,his co-defendant, Harrington, participated in the giving of
a false bond to withdraw certain distilled spirits from a bonded
warehouse. Later he became agent for Harrington in acquiring some of the illegally withdrawn spirits. The Government
forfeited the spirits, including those in Harrington's possession. He claimed that he was innocent of the fraud, and that
he had no knowledge of its perpetration, and sought to establish title to them despite the forfeiture. The Government
countered with the claim that the guilty knowledge of his
agent was imputed to him.
Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, went back into the English decisiofis and found
historically that "Lord Hardwicke thought that the rule could
not be extended sofar as to affect the principal by knowledge
of the agefit acquired previously in a different transaction."
But Justice Bradley observed somewhat sarcastically that if
in fact the agent "still retained the knowledge so formerly
acquired," Lord Hardwicke's idea "was certainly making a
very nice and thin distinction." He fortified his observation
by quoting from a decision of Lord Eldon,2 to the effect that
if the second transaction followed closely upon the first, "it is
impossible," his Lordship tritely remarked "to give a man
credit for having forgotten it." Then Justice Bradley stated
that under Eldon's lead, Hardwicke's "thin" distinction was
entirely overruled by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in the
case of Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. N. S.466 (1864). Then
Justice Bradley in 1870 succinctly stated the rule which has
generally been followed, but with some dissent by the courts
of this country, since its enunciation, as follows:
i. Harrington v. United States, 2 Wall. 356 (U. S. 1877).
2. Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turn. & R. 274 (1823).
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"So that in England the doctrine now seems to be established, that if the agent, at the time of effecting a
purchase, has knowledge of any prior lien, trust, or
fraud, affecting the property, no matter when he acquired
such knowledge, his principal is affected thereby. If he
acquires the knowledge when he effects the purchase, n6
question can arise as to his having it at that time; if he
acquired it previous to the purchase, the presumption that
he still retains it, and has it present to 'his mind, will depend on lapse of time and other circumstances. Knowledge
communicated to the principal himself he is bound to recollect, but he is not bound by knowledge communicated
to his agent, unless it is present to the agent's mind at
the time of effecting the purchase. Clear and satisfactory
proof that it was so present seems to be the only restriction required by the English rule as now understood. With
the qualification that the agent is at liberty to communicate his knowledge to his principal, it appears to us to
be a sound view of the subject."
The qualification stated "that the agent is at liberty to
communicate his knowledge to his principal" has since been
enlarged upon by the courts to fit individual cases as they
have arisen. These enlargements are presently referred to.
It is to be noted that in the Aiken Petroleum Company case,
both in the complaint and in the issues framed by the Court,
somewhat archaic language is used in the allegation of the
complaint and the inquiry to the jury relating to the question
of whether the General Agent-had the knowledge which the
plaintiff claimed was imputed to the principal "in mind and
memory" when he acted for his principal. This engaging
phrase does not appear in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court referred to, nor in any other decision which
we have read until the opinion of Mr. Justice Cothran, of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina (hereinafter referred to),
in the case of Bank of Anderson v. Breedin, 119 S. C. 39, 111
5, E 799 (1921), is reached. Therein Judge Cothran quoted
from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,wherein the author had
coined the apt phrase "in mind and memory." Hence in drafting both the complaint and the issues that expression was purposely used.
In the "Distilled Spirits" decision, supra, the Supreme Court
noted a divergence in the earlier decisions, lining up Bank
of the United States v. Davis, 2 Hill 452, and New York Cen-
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tral Insurance Company v. National Protection Company, 20
Barbour 468, as supporting Lord Hardwicke's now rejected
theory, against Hartv. Farmersand Merchant'sBank, 33 Vermont 252 (1860), as supporting Eldon's view and the view
then authoritatively adopted by the court.
OTHER SUPPORT

Judge Freeman, the erudite author of the valuable editorial
-notes to the reporter system, exhaustively considered the doctrine under discussion in an editorial note appended to his
report of the case of Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W.
129, 24 A. S. 225 (1891). He therein cogently points out that
there are two basic theories upon which knowledge obtained
in any manner by an agent is imputed to his principal. The
first theory is the alter ego theory, which imputes to the principal knowledge obtained by the agent only while he is acting
for the principal, and merely upon the idea that the agent
and the principal are, for the purposes of this inquiry, to be
regarded as being legally identical. This theory excludes knowledge obtained by the agent prior to the existence of the agency.
The second theory is based on the thought that no matter
how acquired, it is the duty of the agent to disclose to his
principal any knowledge whatever that he has affecting the
subject matter of the agency within certain limitations. Judge
Freeman approved the second theory as being more logical
and as being supported by the weight of authority, as he states
in the following quotation taken from his editorial:
"The line of cases which support the other theory, and
which we think are based upon the best reasoning, as
well as the weight of authority, finds the reason of the
rule in the duty of the agent to disclose to his principal
all notice and knowledge which he may possess, and which
is necessary for the protection of the principal. The law
conclusively presumes the agent to have performed this
duty, and imputes to the principal whatever notice or
knowledge is then possessed- by the agent, whether he
has in fact disclosed it or not, and whether or not it came
to his knowledge during the existence of the agency, or
so shortly before its creation as to be presumed to be
present in his mind at the time of the transaction in
question, so long as he is at liberty to discl6se it to his
principal. The rule deducible from the authorities which
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support this theory may be stated to be, that the law imputes to the principal, and charges him with, all notice
or knowledge relating to the subject matter of the agency
which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such
within the scope of his authority, or which he may have
previously acquired, and which he then had in mind, or
which he had acquired so recently as to raise the presumption that he still retained it: The Distilled Spirits, 11
Wall. 356-367; Lebanon Savings Bank v. Hollenbeck, 29
Minn. 322; Wilson v. Minnesota Ins. Ass'n, 36 Minn. 112;
1 Am. St. Rep. 659; Hart v. Farmers' etc. Bank, 33 Vt.
252; Patten v. Merchants' etc. Ins; Co., 40 N. I. 375;
Slattery v. Schwannecke, 118 N. Y. 543; Richardson v.
Panmer, 24 Mo. App. 480; Malten v. Mutual etc. Ins. Co.
58 Vt. 113; Yerger v. Barz, 56 Iowa 77; Fuller v. Altwood, 14 R. I. 293; Flower v. Elwood, 66 Ill. 438; Fairfield Savings Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226; 39 Am. Rep. 319;
Constant v. University, 111 N. Y. 604; 7 Am. St. Rep.
769."

As we have hereinbefore stated, which fact the Supreme
Court of South Carolina recognized in its decision in the Aiken
Petroleum Company case, there are limitations to the rule that
prior knowledge on the part of an agent will be imputed to
his principal. Judge Freeman states that "bhe test as to
whether notice to the agent is notice to the principal, is
'whether or not the information was of a character which it
was the duty of the agent to communicate." The limitation is
aptly stated by the Supreme Court of Maine, in FairfieldSavings Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319 (1881),
as follows (interpolated numerals author's):
"But we think all things considered, the safer and better
rule to be that the knowledge of an agent, obtained prior
to his employment as agent, will be an implied or imputed
notice to the principal, under certain limitations and conditions, which are these: (1) .The knowledge must be
present in the mind of the agent when acting for the
principal, so fully in his mind that it could not have been
at the time forgotten by him; (2) the knowledge or notice must be of a matter so material to the transaction as
to make it the agent's duty. to communicate the fact to
his principal; and (3) the agent himself must have no
personal interest in the matter which would lead hini to
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conceal his knowledge from his principal, but must be at
liberty to communicate it. Additional modification might
be required in some cases. These elements appearing, it
seems just to say that a previous notice to an agent is
present notice to the principal."
The decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
the Aiken Petroleum Company case finds support in three
learned state decisions. The first of these is by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in the case of Shafer v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
53 Wis. 361, 10 N. W. 381 (1881). The Court said:
"But it is said and claimed that in order to charge the
defendant with a knowledge of these facts the agent must
have been acting for it at the time he learned about them.
In other words, that unless the agent acquired them in
his capacity as agent of the defendant, and while engaged
in the transaction of its business, The company will not
be bound by it. We see no reason for thus restricting the
rule. If the agent, when he renewed the policy, had not
forgotten the information which he had received from
the assured on these subjects-if he had in his mind these
facts concerning the risk, knew of the existence of the
judgments and of the foreclosure suit, why should not
this be deemed sufficient, and equivalent to a notice to
the defendant of the same things. If the agent knew the
facts when he was called upon to act for his principal in
the matter, that is all we consider necessary. There is
no hardship in imputing such knowledge of the agent to
the principal. This rule excludes all rumors or loose information, coming to the knowledge of the agent, which
he is not bound to charge his mind with."
The second decision is that of the Supreme Court of California, in Bogart v. George K. Porter Co., 193 Cal. 197, 223
Pac. 959 (1924). The court succinctly stated the rule under
consideration as follows:
"The rule invoked by counsel is subject to the qualification that 'knowledge possessed by an agent while he
occupies that relation and is executing the authority conferred upon him, as to matters within the scope of his
authority, is notice to his principal, although, such knowledge may have been acquired before the agency was created, if it appears that such knowledge was present in
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his mind at the time he acted for the principal.' Cooke v.
Mesmer, 164 Cal. 332, 338; 128 Pac. 917, 920; Christie v.
Sherwobd, 113 Cal. 526, 530; 45 Pac. 820."
A third cogent decision upon the subject is that of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Lebanon Savings Bank v. Hallenbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 13 N. W. 145 (1882), in which the
court says:
"Knowledge of an agent acquired previous to the agency, but appearing to be actually present in his mind during
the agency, and while acting for his principal in the particular transaction or matter, will, as respects such transaction or matter, be deemed notice to his principal, and
will bind him as fully as if originally acquired by him.
(Citing cases.) This rule

*

*

*

if carefully applied

is deemed a salutary one, and calculated to promote justice. and fair dealing."
The general thesis of this article, that the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the Petroleum Company case is supported by the United States Supreme Court, and by the vast majority of the courts of last
resort of the American states, is authoritatively sustained by
an editorial note set out in Ann. Cas. 1912, p. 95. Therein it
is shown that the application of the doctrine as suggested is
supported not only by the United States Supreme Court, but
by the courts of last resort of California, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Minnesota, Mississippi, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. The view that the knowledge obtained by an
agent in a previous employment definitely cannot be imputed
under any circumstances to his principal seems to be supported
only in Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, and Texas:
Before closing the present consideration of the case law
upon the subject, it is proper to refer briefly to at least two
prior decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina upon
the subject involved. In addition to the two decisions in question, there have been numerous other decisions by that court
generally touching the matter in hand, none of which, however, were factually closely akin to the Petroleum Company
case.
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We have heretofore adverted to the decision of Mr. Justice
Cothran in Bank of Anderson v. Breedin, supra. Therein the
Distilled Spirits decision, supra, and the difference of opinion
between Lord I-ardwicke and Lord Eldon were learnedly discussed and many authorities were carefully collated, including
Mr. Pomeroy's work, and Meachem on Agency, and the conclusion was reached that the majority rule, and the more logical one, was that which is frequently herein stated, but the
Justice in question, and this is the point of referring again to
his decision, added a profoundly sensible consideration of the
whole matter which is vividly applicable to the Petroleum
Company case. The suggestiori referred to is, that if the person
who first obtained the knowledge which is sought to be imputed to a principal was not in fact the agent who later carried out the transaction in question, it would not be logical
to impute such knowledge, even though it is actually in the
mind of the first agent, to the principal, but that if, as in the
Petroleum Company case, the same man obtained the knowledge in question, even in a prior agency, and then carried out
the main transaction, it would be entirely logical to impute his
knowledge to his principal. The Justice expressed his thought
in the following manner: "But it presents a very different
aspect when the agent, with knowledge of the damning circumstances, acquired either before the agency began or afterwards in his private capacity, personally consummates the
transaction."
The same thought was pointedly expressed in an early decision of the Sfipreme Court of South Carolina.3 Therein the
same man obtained the knowledge long before the transaction
involved took place, but personally carried through the transaction under consideration. The court ruled:
"It is in that case an instance of knowledge brought
home to the agent of a corporation possessing full authority to act, and actually acting as such in the matter
to which the notice relates-the strongest case of charging a corporation with 'notice of matter known to its
agent."
The distinction suggested by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina may be merely a restatement of a necessarily involved
phase of the doctrine. Nevertheless it is abundantly met by
3. Webb v. Graniteville, 11 S. C. 396 (1878).
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*the admitted facts in the Petroleum Company case, as therein
the same man, the General Agent, who obtained the knowledge
in question while acting for the National Petroleum Company,
actually issued all policies involved in the case, specifically
including the policies of 1942 and 1943 in Western Millers,
in which he inserted the objectionable full co-insurance clauses.
It is of course to be definitely understood that there are
myriads of decisions dealing with the doctrine under discussion, and no effort is being made in this article to do more
than to discuss a few of the leading decisions and determine
where the weight of authority lies, and to determine whether
the South Carolina decision under review is based upon the
prevailing rule of law upon the subject in question.
Even though we refrain, in order to keep this article within
proper limits, from considering the conclusions of eminent
text writers upon the subject involved, our consideration of
the subject under discussion would be entirely incomplete
should we fail to set out the conclusions of such collectors and
expositors of the law as the editors of Corpus Juris and of
American Jurisprudence,and of the compilers of the American
Law Institute Restatement. These, in the order stated, conclude as follows:
"On the question whether a principal is chargeable with
knowledge acquired by an agent prior to the existence of his
agency the authorities differ widely, some holding that in
order to charge the principal the knowledge must be acquired
by the agent during the agency, and that, as a general rule,
knowledge acquired prior thereto will not affect the principal.
The more logical rule, however, and that which is supported
by the great weight of recent authority, is that knowledge
of an agent acquired prior to the existence of the agency
will be chargeable to the principal if it is clearly shown that
the agent, while acting for the principal in a transaction to
which the information is material, has the information present in his mind, or where it was acquired so recently, or
under such circumstances, that it will be presumed to have
been in his mind at the time of the transaction in question;
and provided the information was not obtained under such
circumstances as to make it the legal duty of the agent not
to divulge it to the principal." 2 Corpus Juris, Agency, Sec.
547; p. 867.
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"According to the majority view, which is based upon the
theory of a presumption that the agent performs the duties of
his agency by disclosing to the principal any knowledge which
he may possess necessary or material to the protection of the
principal's interest, the fact that the knowledge with which
the principal is sought to be charged was acquired by the agent
prior to the agency does not prevent the application of the
general rule charging the principal with the knowledge of his
agent." 2 American Jurisprudence, Agency, Sec. 376; p. 294.
"Except as stated in Section 281, the time, place or manner in which knowledge of an agent or servant is obtained,
is immaterial in determining the liability of a principal or
master because of it."
The exception noted is merely the case of there being a duty
on the part of the agent not to disclose his knowledge, which
exception has hereinbefore been adverted to. American Law
Institute Restatement, Agency, Sec. 276; p. 616.
CONCLUSION
Ceasing to multiply authorities and to pile up corroborative
data, we submit and conclude that the facts of the Petroleum
Company's case presented to the South Carolina courts an
especially strong case for the application of the Doctrine
of Imputed Knowledge. We further submit and conclude that
in the case in question, in which the knowledge involved was
gained while Ihe agent was General Agent of the National
Mutual Company, which information had to do with the business of writing insurance on property of Aiken Petroleum
Company, and in which the same General Agent later wrote
the offending policies on properties of the Aiken Petroleum
Company, he personally acting on both occasions, with the
knowledge previously gained by him "in mind and memory",
the conclusion is irresistible that the decision of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina to the effect that his knowledge so
obtained was imputed to his principal is correct, and is based
upon proper legal principles.
And, by the same token, the Insurance Companies and other
concerns which necessarily act through agents, may be assured that they will not be visited with the knowledge of their
agents, acquired in previous employments, except under the
unusual circumstances herein set out.
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